Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nashperfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leadership over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting from increased sales and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and aggregate sales increase due to the strategic use of inventories.
Introduction
Inventory management is a key issue for many firms, be they large or small: wellknown management theories emphasize the need to stay lean, the gain to proceed with just-in-time deliveries and zero inventories, or on the contrary the possibility to benefit from economies of scale by purchasing or producing the economic-orderquantity (Arrow, Harris and Marschak (1951) , Zipkin (2000) ), and hence storing.
The importance of inventories in economic analysis has also been recognized. For instance Arvan and Moses (1982) show that economies of scale in the production of a storable good lead a monopolist to adjust its output in the long run. Social losses then differ compared to the static case. Blanchard (1983) investigates the behaviour of finished good inventories in the U.S. automobile industry 1 . Descriptive statistics show that "production smoothing is not the dominant element of inventory behavior and that target inventory is probably a function of current sales" (p.374, our emphasis), and econometric estimations confirm this finding. Using a sample of U.S.
firms from the good-producing manufacturing industries, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) show that firms hold a larger level of inventories the greater their market power. However an interesting theoretical question is to understand how a target level of inventories is determined when firms are part of an oligopoly, as for example the U.S. automobile industry, and more broadly to investigate how inventory levels vary with the number of firms in competition. Is it possible to revert the causal relationship, and find that a larger equilibrium level of inventories allows firms to enjoy larger equilibrium market shares and consequently a greater market power on an oligopolistic market? Moreover, how is the equilibrium level of inventories affected by changes in the number of competitors, and what are the implications for consumers' surplus? Answering these questions is the object of this study.
Under constant returns-to-scale and in the absence of any capacity constraint, we show that Cournot oligopolistic competition in which n firms produce to store in a first period, before producing again and selling on the market in second period, has a Nash-perfect equilibrium in pure strategy no matter the number of firms in competition or the cost of storage. Equilibria can be multiple and differ according to 1 Blanchard uses monthly data from January 1966 to December 1979 for 10 divisions of the main U.S. manufacturers: 5 from GM, 2 from Ford, 2 from Chrysler and 1 from American Motors.
the number of firms which store. The static Cournot-Nash outcome where no firm stores is the expected unique equilibrium of the game when the cost of storage is large enough, but outside this range it is not an equilibrium anymore. For intermediate or small values of the cost of storage, equilibria are such that a subset of firms is storing a positive quantity to exert endogenously some Stackelberg leadership over the other firms who behave as followers, who do not store and who produce and sell in second period only. The number of firms storing at equilibrium results from the individual trade-off between a larger market share, gained thanks to the endogenous commitment to be more aggressive on the market by accumulating early the output, and a smaller margin, due to the increase in aggregate sales and to the increase in the costs of operations, which are increased by storage costs. As the number of competitors over the two periods increases, the number of firms which can exert some leadership increases but the individual market share of each leader decreases. Facing a margin reduction due to larger aggregate sales and to larger operations costs, not storing may become more profitable than storing when the number of competitors n is large enough, and the number of leaders, which increases when n is small enough, may decrease when n is large enough. We confirm this intuition and show that the number of firms storing and the aggregate inventories at equilibrium can be non monotonic with the number of firms in competition. Finally as the equilibria are asymmetric,-except of course the Cournot one when it occurs -, concentration
increases compared to what it would be at the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium, with identical demand and costs. We show that the Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) is strictly larger than the value it obtains in static Cournot competition, while the price-cost margin is strictly lower due to the increase in aggregate sales caused by inventories; consumers' surplus is therefore larger than in static Cournot competition.
We illustrate these findings and study the effect of an entry of competitors on the set of equilibria with an example. The number of firms storing and the aggregate inventories are non monotonic with respect to the number of firms in competition.
As predicted, both the HHI and the aggregate sales reach levels strictly larger than what they do in static Cournot competition when storing to gain market shares is a profitable strategy: the market is more concentrated and aggregate sales are larger than what it would be if storage were impossible. Together with our theoretical findings, these results suggest that observing a mass of firms storing is more likely on oligopolistic markets than on market structures closer to the duopoly or to perfect competition. Moreover they do also suggest that the HHI cannot be used as the sole measure of competitiveness on markets where the finished product is storable and storage is used to exert some market share leadership.
The commitment value of inventories in two-period Cournot duopolistic competition has been recognized in the literature since the path-breaking articles of Arvan (1985) and Ware (1985) . Both articles identify that once the costs of production have been sunk, inventories endow firms with a capacity from which they can sell while suffering no marginal cost of production. This creates an endogenous discontinuity in the marginal cost the firm is facing when deciding how much to produce and sell on the market, which may result in a first mover advantage. This effect, obviously linked to Dixit (1980) , implies the existence of asymmetric equilibria even if firms are identical with respect to their production technology, and produce and sell simultaneously in every period 2 . In an independent series of papers, Saloner (1987) and Pal ((1991 Pal (( ), (1996 ) study duopolistic Cournot competition with advance production and constant returns-to-scale, to show that multiple equilibria may co-exist, but that this multiplicity disappears with cost variations 3 . The existence of the equilibrium of an oligopolistic market for a storable product remains nonetheless unproven, and its properties when the number of competitors changes stay therefore unexplored.
We generalize the results obtained for a duopoly, to the case of an oligopoly and we characterize the properties of the equilibrium when the number of competitors over the two periods changes. First, we establish the existence of a Nash-perfect equilibrium in pure strategy, and we characterize how the number of firms which store at equilibrium, and how the level of individual inventories kept, depend on the cost of storage and on the number of competitors (as well as on demand and on 2 See also Spulber (1981) , who studies the incentive of an incumbent to hold excess capacity at the equilibrium of a duopoly game with sequential entry, depending whether post-entry competition is of a Cournot or a Stackelberg type; see Ware (1984) , for a different version of the game in Dixit (1984) and Bamon and Frayssé (1985) , that is by constructing the best reply of each firm to the aggregate sales of the industry compatible with this firm optimization
program. Due to the use of inventories, backward reaction mappings turn out to be different across firms even if firms are ex-ante identical, but for each distribution of inventories these backward reaction mappings determine a unique and possibly asymmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy to the second period Cournot subgame.
Our results are closely connected to the broader and more recent literature studying the industrial organization of commodity markets 4 and the strategic role of forward markets. In their seminal article, Allaz and Vila (1993) show that forward markets may be used by Cournot duopolists to compete for the Stackelberg leadership. The equilibrium of the game is however symmetric, firms competing in advance for a larger share of the market 5 . Our paper differs from these studies in the type of commitment considered: while forward sales can be re-interpreted as a commitment which places the entire industry in front of a reduced residual demand when forward contracts are exerted, inventories are committing only the firm which is holding them, source of the asymmetry of the Nash equilibrium. The use of inventories and forward trading in imperfect competition has also been studied in the context of longer dynamic games with uncertain demand and costs (see Kirman and Sobel (1974) and Thille ((2003) , (2006))).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model; section 3 shows that for any distribution of ordered inventories across firms, it exists a unique sub-game equilibrium in which market shares can be asymmetric. Then section 4 derives the equilibria of the game and study the effect of entry. Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes.
Introducing an interest rate allows us to introduce cost differentials between periods that help to select the number of equilibria 6 ; we discuss more broadly this issue after having stated our main results in section 4.
The market demand function is assumed to be linear and known to market participants 7 . This insures that the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique, a useful but not crucial property of the payoff functions 8 . Without loss of generality we assume that its slope is equal to −1; we discuss this assumption at the end of section 4.
Thus:
Assumption B. Let P (S) be the inverse demand function, then
For the ease of the analysis most of the discussion is lead under the following assumption:
Assumption C. The intercept of the inverse demand a and the marginal cost of production c satisfy c ≤ a ≤ 3 c.
We discuss the importance of this assumption in section 4; it basically guarantees that the textbook Stackelberg equilibrium is a feasible outcome of our game. If it is relaxed the asymmetric equilibrium still exists in pure strategies but the leader output is slightly smaller than the textbook Stackelberg output. This feature does not occur in capital accumulation games 9 as players cannot reduce their commitment, while on the contrary in our game players are allowed to sell less than their inventories. Moreover we adopt the convention that if firms inventories differ, then 6 This relates to Pal's 1991 article extending the work of Saloner (1987) . 7 See the path-breaking paper of Klemperer and Meyer (1986) for the analysis of imperfect competition with demand uncertainty. 8 Neither Arvan (1985) nor Saloner (1987) duopoly results rely on it. Assuming a concave inverse demand to work under a more general quasi-concavity assumption on the payoff function as in Romano and Yildirim (2005) would be a costly alternative in terms of mathematical content.
We chose to assume quadratic payoffs to state our results in the simplest form possible. 9 See Saloner (1987) or Romano and Yildirim (2005) .
firm 1 is the one with the highest level of inventories, firm 2 is the one with the second highest level of inventories, ..., and so on.
Convention. Firms are indexed by decreasing order of period 1 production levels,
We assume that any firm can observe all the period 1 production levels but cannot observe the period 2 production and sale levels of its competitors. We discuss this assumption after having presented firms payoffs at the end of this section. Under this assumption the strategy of firm i, denoted by σ i , is a 3-tuple:
where:
with s i satisfying the following condition:
To any n-tuple of strategy σ, σ = {σ 1 , ..., σ i , ..., σ n }, corresponds a payoff function π i for firm i given by, in period 2 value:
We are searching for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this game 10 .
Before analyzing our game, let us discuss the impact of the non-observability of first period actions on our results. Doing a parallel with the way non-observability modifies the impact of an exogenous commitment 11 , we conjecture that the nonobservability of inventories would not jeopardize our results, provided that we introduce a communication technology precise enough. As Schelling (1960) pointed out, the player which has a commitment must make sure the other players know this commitment: it needs a communication technology precise enough. In our paper signals could for example be randomly drawn on inventory levels higher when inventories are large than when they are small. This assumption seems realistic in practice: for example industry reports, mid-year financial statements, or sales employees bargaining with customers may be seen as signals observed by competitors from which posterior beliefs can be derived. We leave the study of this possibility for another paper.
3 Sub-game equilibria
We describe now the sub-game equilibria for each vector of inventories chosen in period 1, q 1 : proposition 1 presents the aggregate oligopolistic sales at the Nash equilibrium of each sub-game. To each aggregate sales corresponds a unique vector of equilibrium individual sales. As expected, individual and aggregate sales in equilibrium depend on the level of inventories produced by firms in period 1, and differ depending on how large individual inventories are. The conditions on inventories characterizing each sub-game can be expressed as differences between the marginal revenues obtained by firms when selling their inventories and the effective marginal costs of production. The formal proof of these results is given in appendix A. We now explain the main steps leading to proposition 1.
The effective marginal cost of production of Cournot oligopolists storing their finished product is linked to, but differ from, the marginal cost of production c as follows. As the cost of production of inventories is sunk when selling on the market in second period, inventories can be thought of as an exhaustible capacity from which firms can sell without producing as long as the quantity currently sold is smaller than the quantity previously stored. The marginal cost of supplying a unit from inventories is therefore equal to 0, as long as inventories are not exhausted.
As soon as its sales exceed its inventories, a firm must produce again and suffers a positive marginal cost of production. Consequently bringing inventories of the finished product from one period to another modifies the economic behaviour of a firm by modifying its second period competitive supply. Although this effect of inventories has already been explained 12 , and obviously relates to Dixit (1980) , it is 12 See Arvan (1985) and Ware (1985) useful to present it differently from older studies by introducing formally the effective marginal cost of production of each firm,
Even if technologies are ex-ante identical, effective marginal costs differ across firms once inventories have been produced, and present a firm-specific jump at s i = q i 1 . The set of economically feasible sales at a given market price is therefore larger when firms store their output than when they do not: firms are now ready to sell up to their inventories q i 1 if the market price goes below their marginal cost of production c. Consequently, by storing a quantity q i 1 large enough, a Cournot competitor may resist to an increase in its opponent sales by still preferring to release its inventories q i 1 on the market rather than reducing its sales. This effect of inventories can be derived by confronting
to obtain the best response of a firm to an increase of its competitors' sales. Given the form of the effective marginal cost of production γ i , the individual best reply shows the three different types of behaviour of firm i, depending on the sales of its competitors S −i and on its initial inventories q 
is lower than the marginal cost c but positive, then firm i sells exactly its inventories.
is strictly negative, then firm i is better off selling less than its inventories. Individual best responses are given by
Inventories therefore create firm-specific kinks in firms best replies, the firm best reply becomes locally inelastic to an increase in its competitors sales, and finally for any given level of sales of its competitors, the level of output a firm sells is higher when it owns inventories than when it does not. This is the source of the asymmetry of the Nash equilibrium in our game.
To find all the equilibria of the game, we start to define the aggregate sales S compatible with the maximisation program of an individual firm i, by adding
, and we invert it to find the aggregate sales of firm i's competitors compatible with firm i maximisation program; we denote S −i (S, q i 1 ) this function. Finally, we deduce the individual sales of firm i which best respond to the aggregate sales S and which are compatible with firm i's optimization, by solving S − s i = S −i (S, q i 1 ) with respect to s i . This last operation gives us the backward reaction mapping s i (S, q i 1 ). We then aggregate all the backward reaction mappings, and we determine the fixed
We draw the reader's attention on the fact that we describe the second period sub-game equilibria focusing on level of inventories lower than the quantity q m a monopoly minimizing its cost of production would produce, q m = (a − c)/2. Indeed, due to the presence of the interest rate ρ and of n − 1 competitors, no firm stores more than the quantity a monopoly producing in second period would sell, and all the sub-games that follow inventory choices larger than q m for all firms are trivially dominated. This restriction turns out to be useful when aggregating the individual best replies to derive the aggregate sales at the Nash equilibrium. To each fixed point ofŜ(S, q , the same must be true for all other firms in this group, explaining condition (1).
On the contrary, the marginal revenues of firms 1, ..., k (who sell exactly their inventories) evaluated at the equilibrium sales of their competitors jump upward the higher the level of a firm inventories. Indeed firm i is confronted to aggregate sales in equilibrium equal to the sum of inventories of firms 1, ..
plus the identical sales of firms k + 1, ..., n. This quantity is lower the higher the level of inventories of firm i, since the aggregate level of inventories of competitors selling these inventories is mechanically lower. The value of the marginal revenue at
1 is however lower the higher the level of inventories of the firm we consider, by definition of the marginal revenue 13 , which explains why focusing on the comparison between the marginal revenue of firm k when selling q k 1 and the marginal cost c is sufficient (condition (2)).
Finally under assumption C, and restricting our attention to q 1 1 ≤ (a − c)/2, condition (3) is verified as long as we consider k < n. However when we characterize the sub-game equilibrium in which all firms are selling exactly their inventories, i.e. such that the marginal revenue of firm n is lower than c when it sells exactly q n 1 , then condition (3) needs to be verified. If (3) is verified, then the marginal revenues of firms 1, ..., n − 1 are also positive, leading to the sub-game equilibrium we are searching for.
The same analysis can be done to characterize all the sub-game equilibria, in particular those in which some firms are selling exactly their inventories and some others less than their inventories. To present all the sub-game equilibria, we intro-
duce the following set of notations. The sequence of sets {B(ℓ)} ℓ=0,...,2n characterizes for each ℓ the values of inventories leading to a sales sub-game in which some firms are selling more than, some firms are selling exactly, and some firms are selling less than their inventories. We define this sequence as follows:
1 , (n − 1)(a − c)/(n + 1)) ≥ c} denotes the set of inventories such that all firms are selling in second period strictly more than their inventories,
• For ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, B(ℓ) denotes the set of inventories such that firms 1, ..., ℓ are selling exactly their inventories and firms ℓ + 1, ..., n are selling strictly more. It is defined as
denotes the set of inventories such that all firms are selling exactly their inventories,
• For ℓ ∈ {n + 1, ..., 2n − 1}, B(ℓ) denotes the set of inventories such that firms 1, ..., ℓ − n sell less than their inventories and firms ℓ − n + 1, ..., n sell exactly their inventories. It is defined as
denotes the set of inventories such that all firms sell less than their inventories.
As its proof shows (available in appendix A.), this set of notations is sufficient to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under assumption C, restricting the attention to inventories lower than the quantity a monopoly minimizing its costs would produce, q 1 1 ≤ (a − c)/2, aggregate sales at the Nash equilibrium are given by:
1. if q 1 ∈ B(0), then all firms sell more than their inventories, and S * (0) =
, 2. if q 1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, then firms 1 to ℓ sell exactly their inventories and
. if q 1 ∈ B(n) then all firms sell exactly their inventories and S
4. if q 1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ ∈ {n + 1, ..., 2n − 1}, then firms 1 to ℓ − n sell less than their inventories and
2n) then all firms sell less than their inventories and S * (2n) = n a n+1 .
As for a given level of industry sales there is a unique corresponding level of individual sales, there is a unique vector of individual sales in equilibrium. Individual sales in equilibrium are given in the corollary at the end of the proof of proposition 1 in appendix A. We turn now to the analysis of the equilibrium of the game.
Inventories in equilibrium and effect of entry
To start with, we state what cannot be an equilibrium of our game, to determine on which of the regions {B(ℓ)} ℓ=0,...,2n we can focus the search for a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, if it exists. The lemma below shows first that firms cannot store in equilibrium more than what they sell in second period: as inventories are costly to produce, firms are strictly better off storing exactly what they sell. Second, the firm with the smallest level of inventories cannot store in equilibrium, as it is better off waiting for the second period to produce.
Lemma 1 Any n-tuple of inventories q 1 = (q 1 1 , ..., q n 1 ) such that:
(i) some firms are selling strictly less than their inventories, i.e. q 1 ∈ B(ℓ) for ℓ = n + 1, ..., 2n,
(ii) firms who are selling strictly more than their inventories are keeping strictly positive inventories, cannot be an equilibrium.
Proof. Since inventories are costly to produce, if they were selling strictly less than their inventories, firms would be strictly better off reducing unilaterally their inventories. Situations in which some firms are selling less than their inventories cannot be an equilibrium: (i) holds for any value of ρ non negative.
To prove (ii) let us examine the profit of firms selling strictly more than their inventories. Consider q 1 ∈ B(ℓ): the total profit of firms i = ℓ + 1, ..., n is given by
As S * (ℓ) and s i * (ℓ) are independent of q i 1 for i = ℓ + 1, ..., n, this profit is strictly decreasing in q i 1 . Remark that from the expression of the bounds of the region in which firms 1 to ℓ are selling exactly their inventories, it is needed that q This property of the equilibrium holds also for firm n when firms 1 to n − 1 sell exactly their inventories: this firm is better off minimizing its cost by storing nothing.
This lemma insures that the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple of inventories (q 1 1 , ..., q n 1 ) such that in the sub-games that follow, a group of firms is selling exactly its inventories while rivals are selling strictly more. Moreover it also proves it is cost minimizing for firms selling strictly more than their inventories not to store at all. This applies in particular to firm n when firms 1, ..., n−1 store in first period. Consequently the search for an equilibrium can be restricted to n-tuple of inventories (q 1 1 , ..., q n 1 ) belonging to region B(ℓ) for ℓ = 1, ..., n − 1, with inventories (q ℓ+1 1 , ..., q n 1 ) being equal to 0. Theorem 1 below and its corollary characterize the equilibria of the game. For each number of firms competing over the two periods, and for every value of (a, c, ρ) satisfying assumption C, these two results determine the n-tuple of inventories (q 1 * 1 , ..., q n * 1 ) stored by firms at the Nash-perfect equilibrium of the game. Equilibria are such that a particular level of inventories are kept by ℓ firms, while n − ℓ are not storing, under certain conditions on n and on the model parameters. The number of firms storing, ℓ, and the individual inventories these firms keep, vary.
The proof of these two results is long and fastidious 14 . It consists in four steps.
First (step 1) we determine the conditions under which the Cournot-Nash outcome is an equilibrium. Then (step 2) we determine the equilibrium values of inventories and the conditions on the model parameters such that ℓ firms store. More specifically to be a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which firms 1, ..., ℓ store and firms ℓ + 1, ..., n do not, a n-tuple of inventories q * 1 (ℓ) ≡ (q optimum for the firms that keep it, and for exactly ℓ firms to store these inventories, the cost of storage must be in between the two bounds. Then (step 3) proves that 14 See web appendix. 15 More specifically the cost of storage ρc relative to the difference between the demand intercept and the marginal cost of production, ρc/(a − c). By an abuse of terminology, we refer to ρ as being the interest rate or equivalently here the cost of storage.
the conditions on the model parameters determined in step 2 do not define an empty subset, and finally step 4 verifies that all possible values of the parameters have been covered, hence ensuring the existence of an equilibrium.
Theorem 1
The game possesses an equilibrium in pure strategies for any n ≥ 2, and a, c, and ρ satisfying assumption C.
Proof: See web appendix.
Corollary 1 It exists two sequences U ≡ {U(n, ℓ)} ℓ=1,...,n−2 and L ≡ {L(n, ℓ)} ℓ=1,...,n−2 , with U(n, ℓ) ≥ L(n, ℓ) for any ℓ = 1, ..., n − 2, given by
which are such that:
• for ρc a−c ≥ U(n, 1), the n-tuple (0, ..., 0) is an equilibrium,
• for any ℓ = 1, ..., n−2 such that L(n, ℓ) ≤ ≤ L(n, n − 2), the n-tuple (q * 1 (n − 1), ..., q * 1 (n − 1), 0) is an equilibrium.
The number of firms storing at equilibrium results from the trade-off between a larger market share, obtained endogenously by an increase in inventories, and a smaller margin due to the increase in aggregate sales and in the cost of operations.
The first case presented in the corollary above corresponds to the static CournotNash equilibrium, that occurs if the cost of storage ρ is large enough compared to the parameters a and c, given the number of firms in competition n. The second case describes the equilibrium in which a subset of ℓ firms is storing, while n − ℓ are not. When deciding to store, a firm enjoys a larger market share and increases its profit, but it shares this leadership with ℓ − 1 other firms storing at equilibrium, and it suffers a larger marginal cost of production compared to the n − ℓ rival firms which do not store. These equilibria are asymmetric even if all firms are ex-ante identical: each firm which stores sells individually more than what a firm which does not store does. Moreover, as we have shown in the proof of the theorem and its corollary, there may be multiple equilibria for the same values of the model parameters: indeed U(n, ℓ) determines an upper bound on ρ below which at least ℓ firms are storing, while L(n, ℓ) determines a lower bound on ρ above which at most ℓ firms store. Since U(n, ℓ + 1) ≥ L(n, ℓ), several possibilities for the number of firms storing and for individual inventories at equilibrium may co-exist for a given value of the model parameters (a, c, ρ). Finally the last case corresponds to the extreme situation of a very small cost of storage relative to the other model parameters and the number of firms in competition, such that all firms store the product, apart one which prefers to wait the second period to produce and sell.
Let us characterize some properties of the equilibria compared to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Since the concentration in market shares is larger than what it would be if storage were not possible, for the same model parameters and the same number of firms in competition, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of concentration should be larger when firms are able to store than when they are not, i.e. larger in our game than in static Cournot competition (everything else equal).
Moreover aggregate sales should be larger and hence the price-cost margin smaller:
the market should be more competitive than in static Cournot competition. Indeed:
Proposition 2 When firms hold inventories, the price-cost margin is strictly lower, and the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index is strictly higher, than the value they obtain in static Cournot competition.
Proof: First, using corollary 1 and proposition 1, the aggregate quantity sold when inventories are strictly positive is given by
that can be compared to S CN = n(a−c) n+1
, the aggregate sales in static Cournot competition. It comes:
This condition is exactly the one that must be satisfied for q * 1 (ℓ) to belong to B(ℓ), obtained in the proof of the theorem, step 2(a), ante-last group of equations 16 ; consequently the aggregate sales of the industry when firms hold inventories are strictly larger than the aggregate sales obtained in static Cournot competition. Hence the market price and the price-cost margin are smaller than in static Cournot competition 17 . Second, the HHI is larger when firms hold inventories than in static Cournot competition. Indeed due to the fact that firms are identical, the equilibrium would be symmetric in static Cournot competition, and market shares identical (equal to 1/n). As we proved in corollary 1, market shares differ across group of firms when the output is stored, and the equilibrium is asymmetric. As the HHI is the sum of squared market shares, this grants immediately that the HHI is larger when firms hold inventories than in static Cournot competition, where it reaches its minimum. .
Proposition 2 immediately implies that consumers surplus increases compared
to static Cournot competition, thanks to the strategic utilization of storage and to the increase in aggregate sales: consumers gain surplus over producers and from the reduction of the deadweight loss. On the other hand, the ℓ firms which store gain profit, and the n − ℓ firms which do not store loose profit, compared to static Cournot competition 18 , and moreover the industry looses profit as a whole due to the increase in aggregate sales and due to the increase in the cost of operations of 16 See (13) in the web appendix. 17 See Boyer and Moreaux ((1985) , (1986)) for a similar result for a Stackelberg oligopoly. 18 The profit of the industry is equal to (P (S
the firms which store. When aggregating consumers surplus and industry profits to compute the Social Welfare and compare it to the one obtained in static Cournot competition, attention must be paid to verify whether the gain for the economy compared to static Cournot competition exceeds the increase in the cost of operations, ρcℓq * 1 (ℓ). This comparison gives another set of conditions on ρc/(a − c) which needs to be compared to the conditions established in corollary 1. Whereas Social Welfare increases when the cost of storage ρ is low enough, a diminution compared to static Cournot competition is sometimes possible 19 , for some value of the model parameters.
The second property of the equilibria is to vary non monotonically when the number of firms in competition n over the two periods increases. As corollary 1 establishes, an increase in the number of leaders reduces the individual increase in market share each of them can obtain by storing the product: storing is individually more profitable when a few firms do the practice. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors over the two periods reduces the margin of all firms. This suggests a non monotonicity of the number of competitors storing at equilibrium 20 .
We confirm this possibility:
Proposition 3 The number of firms storing ℓ and the industry inventories ℓq * 1 (ℓ) may be non-monotonic in the number of firms in competition n.
Proof. Let us examine the values of the bounds on ρc/(a − c) established for the extreme cases, ℓ = 1 and ℓ = n − 2. We have:
19 See web appendix, section 2. 20 The non-monotonicity occurs in our paper in a two-period game where players are engaged in a pro-competitive practice (storage). In their study of mergers (or collusion) in static Cournot oligopoly, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that these anti-competitive practices may decrease the profit of the merging companies (compared to their aggregate pre-merger profit), depending on the number of firms present on the market pre-and post-merger, and merging.
It is immediate to check that the lower bounds given by (12) and (13) are strictly decreasing with respect to n. Moreover it is possible to plot as a function of n the upper bounds given by (10) and (11) with a mathematical software (e.g. Maxima or Mathematica), for values n ≥ 2, to prove that it is non monotonic (concave) in n. By continuity of U(n, ℓ) and L(n, ℓ) with respect to ℓ, there is a subset of values for ℓ in 1, ..., n − 2 for which U(n, ℓ) and L(n, ℓ) are non monotonic in n. Therefore, for a given value of ρc/(a − c), the number of firms storing at equilibrium, that results from the comparison of the sequences U and L with ρc/(a − c), may be nonmonotonic in the number of firms in competition, n. It follows that the aggregate inventories in equilibrium ℓq * 1 (ℓ) can also be non-monotonic in n.
The intuition for this result is the following: storing to exert some leadership with other leaders is profitable as long as the reduction in margin associated with a larger level of inventories does not offset the gain from a larger individual market share.
The reduction in margin comes from (i), the increase in the marginal cost from c to (1 + ρ)c, and from (ii), the increase in the aggregate volume sold (which causes a reduction in the market price). An increase in the number of firms n increases the number of firms which have the possibility to act as leaders, but (inspecting the equilibrium inventory in corollary 1, second bullet), the larger the number of leaders the smaller the individual volume gained by each firm, and (proposition 2) the larger the aggregate volume sold. When n is large enough, the strategy of not storing at all preserves one's margin by avoiding the reductions described in (i) and (ii) above, even if it is at the cost of a smaller equilibrium market share. This latter strategy is more profitable than to store but share the leadership with ℓ − 1 other firms when n is large enough, and suffer higher costs. The opposite force is at work when n is small enough: the gain from an increase in individual sales exceeds the reduction in margin. Consequently the number of leaders ℓ increases and then decreases at equilibrium when the number of competitors n increases, and so do the aggregate inventories.
It is possible to study the effect of an entry of competitors on the market by using the corollary of Theorem 1 to compute in an example the number of firms storing at equilibrium, the aggregate inventories kept by the industry, the aggregate sales of firms that do not store, the aggregate industry sales, and compare these values to the outcome of static Cournot competition when the number of competitors changes.
The table below produces an example for a = 2.5, c = 1, and ρ = 0.03, generated with a spreadsheet software.
[
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Let us briefly describe the content of the table. Column (1) indicates the number of firms competing on the market, column (2) (respectively (3)) the minimal (resp. maximal) number of firms storing at equilibrium. These numbers are directly coming from the conditions on ρ expressed in the corollary, and whenever they are identical we suppressed the one in column (2) 21 . Then column (4) (resp. (5)) presents the aggregate level of inventories stored by the minimal (resp. maximal) number of firms storing, while column (6) (resp. (7)) shows the aggregate sales of the firms that are not storing when the number of firms storing is minimum (resp. maximum).
Column (8) (resp. (9)) presents the total sales of the industry when the number of firms storing is minimal (resp. maximal), that can be compared to the aggregate sales a static Cournot oligopoly would realize, computed in column (10) and equal to n(a − c)/(n + 1).
As the table presents in columns (2) and (3), there may be multiple equilibria.
Moreover as column (4) and (5) show, the minimal and the maximal number of firms storing at equilibrium, as well as the corresponding aggregate inventories of the industry, are non monotonic in the number of firms in competition n: when n increases, the number of firms storing at equilibrium and the level of aggregate inventories increase, to then decrease when n is large enough. This illustrates the 21 It is replaced with a −; the same convention applies to the rest of the table.
trade-off we described: the profitability of exerting some leadership by storing decreases the larger the number of firms in competition for a given cost of storage.
When the number of firms is large enough, all the gains in volume obtained through leadership are offset by losses in margin over a marginal cost that includes the cost of storage. In that case the unique equilibrium is the Cournot-Nash one. This feature implies that the aggregate level of inventories is non-monotonic in the number of competitors on the market. For example when n = 6, there can be up to 3 firms storing, and industry sales equal to 1.384 (in column (9)) are 7% higher than 1.286, the value they reach in static Cournot competition (column (10)). For n = 13, up to 5 firms store and sales equal to 1.447 are 3.8% higher than in static Cournot competition. For n = 19, up to 3 firms are storing and sales equal to 1.455 are 2%
higher than in static Cournot competition.
We also compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) when the number of firms storing is minimal (resp. maximal), presented in column (11) (resp. (12)), that can be compared to the HHI at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (column (13)). The aggregate sales and the market share concentration may therefore simultaneously increase when the number of firms decreases from perfect competition to oligopolistic market structure, and are clearly larger than their values in Cournot competition.
In the example for n = 6, the HHI is 25% higher in our model than in Cournot (HHI = 2076 instead of 1666), and twice higher for n = 19 (HHI = 1155 instead of 526)! Comparing our results to the HHI thresholds from the U.S. Horizontal Mergers Guidelines 22 , the static Cournot market with n = 10 firms would be unconcentrated (HHI = 1000), while if 3 firms store as it is potentially the case at equilibrium, the HHI = 1619 would make it fall into the category of moderately concentrated markets. Aggregate sales are nonetheless larger, and the price-cost margin smaller, when strategic inventories are used.
We conclude this section by addressing three comments, first on the role of assumption C, second on the role of a small interest rate, and third on the impact of demand uncertainty. If we relax assumption C to consider any type of market demand, we would still get asymmetric equilibria. However there would be an additional upper limit on individual inventories to consider, in addition to the conditions 22 of August 19, 2010 in the sets B(ℓ) we presented 23 .
By introducing the interest rate, we made first period production slightly more costly than second period production. This allows us to rule out of the set of equilibria the weakly dominated ones. If there were no interest rate, the ultimate follower would be indifferent between producing in period 1 and producing in period 2, and if this firm produces the n-firms Cournot production in period 1, then all the other firms are also better off producing a Cournot outcome in period 1. The result we would obtain in our game would be a generalization to the case of an oligopoly of the result obtained for a duopoly by Saloner (1987) , who shows that any pair of inventories on the outer envelope of the Cournot reaction functions between the two Stackelberg outcomes 24 is an equilibrium in pure strategies. The interest rate (or a cost of storage) is a selection device that forces the ultimate follower to wait until period 2 to produce: this can be seen as a special case of the selection criterium presented in the duopoly game by Pal ((1991 Pal (( ), (1996 ) 25 , who consider more generally cost differentials between periods. In an oligopoly the cost of storage is the economic force that determines how many firms store and exert some leadership amongst all the market competitors, allowing nonetheless different number of firms to store at equilibrium, and hence multiple equilibria.
Finally we assumed a non-random demand 3 ). The role of assumption C is to rule out credible threats of putting leaders with redundant inventories, by forcing prices to be lower than the marginal cost when a follower increases its inventories to force the leader to sell less than its inventories. Although Arvan (1985) identifies the possibility for a leader to be put with redundant inventories in his duopoly setting, he does not show that for this threat to modify the behaviour of the leader, it must be the case that the market price stays at a level such that the follower realizes a non-negative profit. The fact that redundant production may matter has not been analyzed by Saloner (1987 ), Pal ((1991 ), (1996 ).
24 Under extra assumptions on demand and cost missing in Saloner's work relating to assumption C and to the fact that leaders may be put with redundant production, as argued before. 25 See also Robson (1990) . 26 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this discussion.
profit which is a function of the expected demand. It suffices to assume that this expected demand satisfies assumption C to obtain our results. In the case where the uncertainty affects the slope of the inverse demand, our results do not change either.
As it is known from static Cournot competition with linear demand and costs, the slope of the inverse demand is a scale parameter of the equilibrium quantities and profit: the smaller the slope (in absolute value), the larger the potential market and the larger the equilibrium quantities and profits. This is also true in our model, and it is possible to rewrite the results and the proofs of proposition 1 and theorem 1 as a function of the expected slope of the inverse demand, without changing the conditions on the number of firms and on the interest rate ρ such that an equilibrium with a certain number of firms storing exists 27 .
Conclusion
Without any other incentive than strategic to store, and in a perfectly symmetric setting, this paper shows that it is possible to observe positive level of inventories and asymmetric market shares at the equilibrium of a two-period Cournot oligopolistic market, no matter the finite number of firms in competition. The rationale for storing lies in the fact that inventories may be used to exert some market share leadership, but at the cost of reduced margins. The main intuition is that by dumping the cost of production of inventories in first period, firms obtain an endogenous but fixed capacity from which they can sell at zero marginal cost in second period. This marginal cost advantage translates into the search for leadership in our setting of oligopolistic quantity competition with perfect substitutes: firms choose a level of inventories such that their market share is increased compared to the static situation, aggregate sales are larger than when storage is impossible or the interaction is static, and the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index is also larger. The number of firms which store at equilibrium varies with the number of firms in competition, but as some firms store before selling while the others produce and sell simultaneously, our 27 Material available upon request. Assumption C is unaffected; the sets B(ℓ) are unchanged;
a − c and a become respectively (a − c)/b and a/b in proposition 1, where b is the expected slope of the inverse demand. The equilibrium quantities in corollary 1 to theorem 1 are divided by b.
Equilibrium profits are inversely proportional to b, which cancels out when comparing these profits.
The sequences U and L are therefore unaffected, and proposition 2 and 3 still hold.
paper suggests that "make-to-stock" and "make-to-order" organizations of the operations may co-exist at the Nash equilibrium of an oligopolistic interaction on the final market. Finally an example illustrates the fact that observing larger industry inventories and a larger number of firms storing is more likely under an oligopolistic market structure than under market structures closer to the duopoly or to perfect competition: the number of firms storing and the aggregate inventories are non monotonic in the number of market participants.
Then we invert it to obtain the inverse cumulative best response function S
is strictly increasing it has a unique inverse,
Finally we solve for the individual sale
1 )}, to obtain the backward reaction mapping,
where as in (7), given some industry sales S, firm i can either sell more than (first line of (16)), or sell exactly (second line of (16)), or sell less than (third line of (16)) its inventories q i 1 . Under assumptions C and under the convention that firm i owns larger inventories than firm i + 1, summing all the backward reaction mappings to obtain S(S, q 1 ) can be done easily. Indeed for any level of industry sales S, all firms are either selling at least their inventories or selling at most their inventories, but it is not possible that some of them sell strictly more than their inventories, while some others are selling strictly less. To put it differently the cut-off values for S determining the reaction of an individual firm in (16) are "nicely" ranked across firms. To see this, first remark that
and
As justified in step 1, there is no loss of generality to restrict our attention to period 1 productions lower than q m = (a − c)/2. Consequently the lower bound in the sequence of inequalities (18) can be minored, a − q 1 1 ≥ (a + c)/2. It suffices to remark that as a consequence of C, the upper bound of the sequence of inequalities (17) is lower than the lower bound of the sequence (18), i.e. a − c ≤ (a + c)/2, to be able to rank across all firms the cut-off values at which there are kinks in the backward reaction mappings (16)
For a level of industry sales S lower than a − c − q 1 1 , all firms are selling more than their period 1 production and consequently the sum of all the backward reaction mappings is simply equal to n times the expression in the first line of (16) 
Step 3 determines the fixed points of S(S, q 1 ). As there are 2n cut-off values determining the different expressions of S, there are 2 n + 1 different expressions and potentially 2n+1 different sub-game equilibria to find. We index the consecutive lines from (20) by ℓ = 0, ..., 2 n: at line 0 all firms sell more than their inventories, at line 1 firm 1 sells exactly its inventories and the others more,... and so on.
At line n all firms sell exactly their inventories and at line n + 1 firm 1 sells less than its inventories while the others sell exactly their inventories, until line 2n. We derive the fixed points of S(S, q 1 ) line by line: for every line ℓ = 0, ..., 2n, there is a unique equilibrium aggregate sales level S * (ℓ). To this equilibrium industry sales S * (ℓ) corresponds a unique set of period 1 inventories B(ℓ) such that if the vector of firms inventories q 1 belongs to B(ℓ), then the equilibrium is S * (ℓ). Let us describe these fixed points and the sets that are associated to them. The equilibrium in which all firms sell more than their inventories (line ℓ = 0) is characterized by S * (0) = n(a − c)/(n + 1). Inventories must be such that S * (0) ≤ a − c − q 
For ℓ = 1, ..., n − 1, equilibrium aggregate sales are S * (ℓ) = ((n − ℓ)(a − c) + Finally for ℓ = 2n, S * (2n) = na/(n + 1) and q 1 ∈ B(2n) such that B(2n) = {q 1 /q n 1 ≥ a/(n + 1)} .
The intersection between (the interior of) two sets is empty, B(ℓ) B(ℓ ′ ) = ∅ for ℓ = ℓ ′ , and the reunion of all sets ℓ=0,...,2n B(ℓ) encompasses exactly all the cases for q 1 we are interested in. We complete this proof by expressing the conditions on inventories in terms of conditions on the marginal revenues to obtain our result.
Obviously, 
